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RAPANOS, CARABELL, AND THE ISOLATED MAN
Joel B. Eisen **
We gather yet again this year at the University of Richmond to
discuss the deplorable state of the Chesapeake Bay and the con-
certed effort needed to bring it back from the brink of death. The
state of the Bay seems not much better than it did eleven years
ago, when a group of wise souls who cared deeply about the Bay
assembled at this law school to revisit the Kepone incident and
call for more action to stem pollution in the Bay.' To no one's sur-
prise, unfortunately, that august group assembled in our Moot
Court Room did not solve the Bay's problems.
In some respects, the news today is even worse. The Chesa-
peake Bay Foundation reports that:
Pollution is choking the Bay and many of its tributary rivers. In the
summer of 2005, 41 percent of the volume of the Bay was considered
a "dead zone," an area with insufficient oxygen to support marine
life. The Chesapeake Bay Program, an arm of the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA)z recently declared that the size of
this area is the largest on record.
** Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. J.D., 1985, Stanford
Law School; B.S., 1981, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The author thanks students Clarissa Berry, Michael Wall, and Crista Whitman for
their research assistance, and Jon Mueller of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation for his in-
sights. Also, thanks are due to my colleague Carl Tobias and the University of Richmond
Law Review for keeping the issue of Bay cleanup in the public eye, and to Erin Ryan for
her wise counsel.
1. See generally The Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr., et al., Panel Discussion, Al-
lied Chemical, the Kepone Incident, and the Settlements: Twenty Years Later, 29 U. RICH.
L. REV. 493 (1995) (discussing the environmental effects and legal consequences of the re-
lease of the chemical Kepone from a manufacturing facility into the James River, a tribu-
tary of the Chesapeake Bay).
2. Brief for the Chesapeake Bay Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents at 1, Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1034), Carabell
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1384) [hereinafter CBF
Amicus Brief); see also Jon A. Mueller & Joseph Tannery, Why Does the Chesapeake Bay
Need Litigators? 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1113 (2006).
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What's different now, and possibly encouraging, is the emer-
gence of a high-profile effort, first announced by outgoing Gover-
nor Mark Warner, to steer millions of dollars of state funding to-
ward the Bay.3 The Virginia General Assembly is likely to go
along with this request.' Even if it does, that is just a down pay-
ment on the eventual billions it will take to curb pollution and
bring the Bay back.'
More than that, we know, as we have known for years, that
real action will take enforceable limits on personal and commer-
cial behavior, both of which have been exceedingly difficult to put
into place 6 -if you don't believe me, just ask the poultry farmers.7
3. See Rex Springston, Board OKs Bay Rules: Warner Proposes Funds 'Strict' Regula-
tions Require Improvements to About 125 Sewage Plants and Factories, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Nov. 22, 2005, at B1; see also Gov. Warner's Budget Proposal, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Jan. 8, 2006, at C2.
4. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Va. House Republicans Back $240 Million for
Bay Cleanup, Jan. 25, 2006, http://www.cbf.org/site/News2?abbr=VAGA2006b&page=
NewsArticle&id=13417. While the news is good, the source of these funds poses a continu-
ing problem. The millions spent in 2006 would be a short-term allocation of funds in the
current Virginia state budget. Fred Carroll, Fight for Funds Might See Highways vs. Wa-
terways, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, Va.), Jan. 17, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
923781. The remaining problem, then, is that Bay cleanup funding continues to be subject
to the vagaries of budgetary winds blowing in each General Assembly session. If too much
funding is needed for transportation, then there is perhaps less Bay cleanup funding. This
untenable situation has been the subject of much recent attention. See, e.g., id. Virginia
House Joint Resolution 640, enacted in 2005, established a joint subcommittee that met
throughout 2005 to analyze long-term funding options for Bay cleanup. H.J. Res. 640,
2005, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2005). The joint subcommittee meetings produced
much heat but no light: there was no agreement on a specific funding mechanism. In the
2006 General Assembly session, a number of bills were introduced to create just that (in
different imaginative ways), see, e.g., S.B. 626, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2005),
but none of them passed and the fate of permanent cleanup funding is uncertain. Senator
Frederick Quayle (R-Chesapeake) sponsored Senate Bill 626, to establish a dedicated
source of $70 million in annual funding for Bay cleanup from a lodging fee and recordation
tax. See id. In February 2006, the General Assembly carried over Quayle's bill for one
year, which is the equivalent of killing a bill in Virginia's part-year legislature. See Chesa-
peake Bay Foundation, Dedicated Funding Bill Carried Over for One Year,
http://www.cbf.org/site/ DocServer/626_Carryover-doc?doclD=4983 (last visited Mar. 30,
2006). Still, proponents of long-term funding solutions were optimistic that the Assembly
would eventually implement some form of solution. See id.
5. The resolution establishing the joint subcommittee that examined long-term fund-
ing options stated in part, "the cost of achieving the required reductions in nitrogen and
phosphorous pollution in Virginia is estimated to exceed $3 billion." H.J. Res. 640, 2005
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2005).
6. See CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, MANURE'S IMPACT ON RIVERS, STREAMS AND
THE CHESAPEAKE BAY 3 (2004), available at http:!!cbf.org/siteDocServer0723ManureRe
port Embargoed.pdf?dpcID=2083.
7. See generally id. at 4 (documenting the severe impacts of poultry and other animal
wastes on the Bay). Making those involved take responsibility for this problem can be dif-
ficult. In 2003, the Maryland Department of the Environment stopped its "co-permitting"
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Market-based "trading" programs such as the proposed "nutrient
trading" system' may or may not be the answer. Unlike the well-
known program of trading acid rain allowances under the Clean
Air Act ("the CAA"),9 there are far more sources of water pollution
involved. Therefore, complex mechanisms would be required to
achieve some improvements in water quality. The idea of "nutri-
ent trading" raises more questions than answers, 10 and I suspect
it will be quite a few years before a scheme of this sort is in place,
let alone before we can know if it worked.
The size of the Chesapeake Bay watershed and the multiplicity
of polluters dashes any hope for a quick fix to the Bay's problem.
In the dense lingo of environmental law, cleanup of the Bay relies
on the adoption of workable measures to deal with pollution from
a wide array of "nonpoint sources""l--essentially sources you can-
process that required chicken processors to help farmers dispose of wastes. See Tim Craig,
Farmers Are Left To Dispose of Waste; Md. Reverses Policy Forcing Poultry Processors to
Help, BALT. SUN, June 15, 2003, at 1B; see also Progress in Safeguarding Chesapeake Bay:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of
Donald F. Boesch, President, University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science),
available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/GovtReformBoeschFinal.pdf (observing
that "[rdeductions in agricultural nonpoint sources have been difficult because of limita-
tions in the effectiveness of management practices and economic constraints").
8. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.19:12 to :19 (Cum. Supp. 2005) (establishing a
"Chesapeake Bay Watershed Nutrient Credit Exchange Program"); Va. Dep't of Envtl.
Quality, Notice of Intended Regulatory Action: Adopt General Virginia Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System ("VPDES") Watershed Permit Regulation For Total Nitrogen
and Total Phosphorus Discharges and Nutrient Trading In the Chesapeake Bay Water-
shed in Virginia (May 2, 2005), available at http://www.deq.state.va.us/vpdes/pdf/pnnu
trienttradingNOIRA.pdf (proposing a watershed-based permit to serve as a foundation for
nutrient trading). The Virginia Department of Environmental Quality's ("VDEQ") home
page for the Watershed General VPDES Permit for Nutrient Discharges to the Chesa-
peake Bay is located at http://www.deq.state.va.us/vpdes/.
9. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651, 7651a-7651o (2000).
10. For a discussion of the challenges facing Virginia's program, see Scott Harper,
Virginia Program To Let Facilities Trade Water-Pollution Credits, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Nor-
folk, Va.), Apr. 9, 2005. The extensive literature on nutrient trading programs includes
Tom Arrandale, Trading for Clean Water, GOVERNING, Apr. 2004, at 32; James Boyd, The
New Face of the Clean Water Act: A Critical Review of the EPA's New TMDL Rules, 11
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 39, 78-85 (2000) (discussing economic considerations and prac-
tical challenges of nutrient trading); Richard D. Horan & James S. Shortle, When Two
Wrongs Make a Right: Second-Best Point-Nonpoint Trading Ratios, 87 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.
340 (2005) (discussing the economic theory underlying nutrient trading); Thomas K. Rup-
pert, Water Quality Trading and Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution: An Analysis of
the Effectiveness and Fairness of EPA's Policy on Water Quality Trading, 15 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 1 (2004) (explaining the theory behind, advantages of, and disadvantages of trading);
Andrew M. Wolman, Effluent Trading in the United States and Australia, 8 GREAT PLAINS
NAT. RES. J. 1, 11-12 (2003) (discussing the history and economics of effluent trading pro-
grams in the United States).
11. E.P.A., What is Nonpoint Source (NPS) Pollution? Questions and Answers,
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not "point to,"12 as we instruct our students in environmental law
courses. It may not seem like much when I put fertilizers on my
suburban lawn, but when combined with the acts of numerous
others in my subdivision, it is obvious that cleaning up the Bay is
going to require a lot of effort on the part of many individuals. I
wish my suburban neighbors did more for the Bay than just put
"Save the Bay" bumper stickers on their wagons and SUJVs, but
they do not. They are not alone, of course, and the fact that con-
trolling nonpoint source pollution has proven difficult to do in the
mid-Atlantic region and nationwide, despite efforts by Congress
and the states for several decades, 3 only adds to the magnitude of
the task at hand.
Of course, progress in environmental law always starts with a
problem like this. We are always trying to take a long-term view,
and requiring (or cajoling, in the case of incentive programs)
someone--or a lot of someones-to internalize environmental
costs they would not otherwise consider. We assume that in the
absence of Clean Water Act ("CWA") permits, 4 widget factories
would dump their excess wastes into water bodies without so
much as a fare-thee-well. Environmental protection also has had
a collective nature about it: we are all in it together or not at all. 5
http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/NPS/qa.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) ("Nonpoint source(NPS) pollution... comes from many diffuse sources."). There is no statutory or regulatory
definition of a nonpoint source; instead, any source of water pollution that is not a point
source is treated as a nonpoint sources. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Ur-
banism: Lessons From Federal Regulation of Urban Stormwater Runoff, 48 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1, 37-38 (1995) (describing this basic division in the Clean Water Act
as applied to the problem of urban stormwater runoff, which originates from a nonpoint
source-driveways and land-and flows through point sources--outfalls-into water bod-
ies).
12. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000) (defining the term "point source" to include a
number of tangible sources to which you could actually point).
13. See Eisen, supra note 11, at 38-39 & 38 n.189 (discussing the failure of the non-
point source regulatory programs established under sections 208 and 319 of the Clean Wa-
ter Act). Evidence that nonpoint sources remain major problems is not hard to find. The
Chesapeake Bay Foundation's depressing annual report card on the state of the Bay notes
that the "primary sources of nitrogen and phosphorus pollution [include] agricultural, ur-
ban, and suburban runoff." CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE BAY REPORT
2005, at 4 (2005), available at http://cbf.org/sitelDocServer/sotb2005lores.pddoc ID=4564.
Nor is the Mid-Atlantic region alone in facing a nonpoint source problem. Budget Focus on
'Partnerships' Misdirects Key State Funds, Critics Say, INSIDE THE EPA, Feb. 10, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 2262920 ("Most state officials [say] that their biggest water prob-
lem is nonpoint source pollution.").
14. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000) (delineating the structure of the National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System permitting process).
15. This, of course, often leads to derision from the far right. See, e.g., The Rush Lim-
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Most law students are familiar with the "Tragedy of the Com-
mons" and the notion that left unchecked, private actors will have
every incentive to maximize their use of common resources.
16
So from the early heady days of environmental law during the
1960s, we have frequently been reminded about the intercon-
nected nature of environmental protection and the major effects
that can result from a seemingly insignificant act. The "butterfly
flapping its wings has global impacts" scenario may be clich6d,
17
but as is the case of all cliches it has some merit. Thus, in a suc-
cessful program of regulation-whether the problem at hand is
unwanted pollution in the Chesapeake Bay or global warming-
every relevant actor has to be involved. A successful program
cannot allow one polluter to skate by while another is restricted.
The Chesapeake Bay cleanup program has this pan-regional sort
of ambition, as it must to gain some traction on this vexing set of
problems. 18
Now just as we consider the ramping up of a massive multi-
jurisdictional program of environmental protection that could af-
fect millions of people in several mid-Atlantic states, the Supreme
Court has heard arguments in two cases that could create an opt-
out provision for environmental protection, so to speak. In Ra-
panos and Carabell,19 the Court may well cross a threshold it
stopped at in 2001 with the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (SWANCC) 2 ° case: declar-
baugh Show Audio Transcript, Professor Limbaugh Debunks Junk Earth Science (Aug. 10,
2005) ("[TIhe modern environmental movement is simply the latest refuge for communists
and socialists who are opposed to capitalism.").
16. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
17. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve
the Global Environment?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 190, 192 (1990) ("An environmental interven-
tion as slight as a butterfly flapping its wings near a weather station will chance long-
term weather predictions.").
18. In its amicus brief on Rapanos and Carabell, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation ob-
serves that Bay cleanup will take considerable cooperation among affected states and the
District of Columbia. Of course, cleaning up the Bay has been enshrined in law as a multi-
jurisdictional responsibility for decades. The CBF makes clear that to achieve program
goals, states cannot opt out of the cleanup program. CBF Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 27
(noting that, "[tlo achieve these ambitious pollution reduction commitments[,] all six Bay
watershed states and the District of Columbia must 'pull their weight').
19. See United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S.
Ct. 414 (2005); Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005). The two cases were consolidated for oral argument, which
was held on February 21, 2006.
20. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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ing that the Commerce Clause does not permit the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers to engage in Clean Water Act regulation of so-
called isolated wetlands. In SWANCC, the Court ducked the diffi-
cult issue. It invalidated the Corps of Engineers' "Migratory Bird
Rule" but stated that it was not basing its decision on the Com-
merce Clause.2' An adverse decision in Repanos and Carabell
would fly in the face of the collective spirit needed to accomplish a
task so massive as cleanup of the Bay. It would in effect create
the "isolated man," the resident of watersheds such as the Chesa-
peake Bay who opts out of environmental protection scheme. This
is potentially dangerous and should be avoided.
The facts of Rapanos and Carabell are well known and summa-
rized at painstaking length in the Sixth Circuit opinions. The le-
gal challenge is much the same as in SWANCC: determining
whether the wetlands in question are "adjacent to" protected "in-
terstate waters," which are in turn defined in the CWA as "waters
of the United States,"22 that is, waters over which the federal gov-
ernment has Commerce Clause jurisdiction. The question is how
much of a connection (hydrological or other) is required between
the wetlands and a water body that is navigable in the true sense
of the word. As the Washington Legal Foundation attempts to
frame the issue in its amicus brief, if we don't require a signifi-
cant physical connection to navigable waters before we regulate,
then "[t]he distance to the river-twenty miles-is irrelevant; all
that matters is that the water eventually reaches the river."23
This question, hardly one of mere semantics, has provoked in-
tense debate, and various Courts of Appeal, including the Fourth
Circuit in Deaton and Newdunn,24 have struggled with the issue.
21. See Migratory Bird Rule, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2005), invalidated by SWANCC,
531 U.S. at 159.
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
23. Brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners at 7, Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1034) [herein-
after Washington Legal Foundation Amicus Brie/].
24. United States v. Deaton, 332 F. 3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 972(2004); Treacy v. Newdunn Assoc., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 972(2004). In SWANCC, the Court stated, based on its 1985 decision in Riverside Bayview
Homes, that the Corps has CWA jurisdiction over some waters that are not actually "navi-
gable" in the lay sense of the word:
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121 (1985), we
held that the Corps had § 404(a) jurisdiction over wetlands that actually
abutted on a navigable waterway. In so doing, we noted that the term "navi-
gable" is of "limited import" and that Congress evidenced its intent to 'regu-
late at least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the
1104 [Vol. 40:1099
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It is not all too surprising that the question has landed once again
in the Supreme Court.
The decision in these combined cases could have profound im-
plications for not just Michigan but watersheds in other states
and regions, including, of course, the Chesapeake Bay. The
Chesapeake Bay Foundation's amicus brief makes clear that the
failure to regulate isolated wetlands will have broad impacts in a
watershed such as that of the Chesapeake Bay.
The Chesapeake Bay receives fully half of its water from an intricate
network of 110,000 streams and 1.7 million wetlands most of which
are non-navigable tributaries and non-tidal wetlands that drain or
"tend to drain" to those tributaries, very much like the wetlands and
tributaries at issue in these cases. This brief will demonstrate that
the headwater streams and wetlands, and other non-navigable tribu-
taries and associated wetlands, of the 64,000 square mile Chesa-
peake Bay watershed are indeed "inseparably bound up" with the
Susquehanna, the Potomac, the James, and the other large naviga-
ble rivers that flow to the Bay. This intricate hydrological network
cleanses the surface water, recharges the groundwater, moderates
the flood flows, and provides the aquatic habitat on which the eco-
logical and economic life of the Chesapeake Bay and its watershed
depends. The health of the Chesapeake Bay truly does begin at its25
source.
There is even more at stake than this. Because the CWA's defi-
nition of "waters of the United States" is at issue, reversals in
these two cases could mark the first time the Supreme Court has
put the brakes on the use of the Commerce Clause to justify envi-
classical understanding of that term."
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167 (citations omitted). While the Court acknowledged that it had
previously recognized that the Corps has jurisdiction over waters that are "adjacent" to
navigable waterways, it declined to find that "isolated ponds, some only seasonal, wholly
located within two Illinois counties, . . . because they serve as habitat for migratory birds"
were adjacent to navigable waters (and hence subject to the Corps' jurisdiction). Id. at
171-72.
The pivotal question for lower courts deciding cases in the wake of SWANCC-and now
for the Supreme Court in Rapanos and Carabell-then became the meaning of the word
"adjacent" in situations where the wetlands in question had some degree of interconnect-
edness to navigable waters. Would only those wetlands directly abutting navigable waters
qualify for protection? Some courts said "yes." See, e.g., In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345-
46 (5th Cir. 2003) (limiting the Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA to navigable waters and
non-navigable waters that directly abut navigable waters). Other courts (including the
Fourth Circuit and, of course, the Sixth Circuit in Rapanos and Carabell) declined to read
SWANCC that broadly, and limited the decision to its precise holding that the CWA does
not reach isolated waters that have no connection with navigable waters. See, e.g., Deaton,
332 F.3d at 708-12; Newdunn, 344 F.3d at 416-17.
25. CBFAmicus Brief, supra note 2, at 2.
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ronmental laws. In his petition for certiorari, John Rapanos in-
vited the Court to go down this road, claiming that these isolated
waters are not subject to federal jurisdiction because they have
nothing to do with commerce.2 6 To date, since Lopez27 and Morri-
son,2" the Court has not yet been willing to tackle this issue in
any meaningful sense in an environmental case; it simply de-
clined to do so in SWANCC. 29 If, however, the barn door opens,
and the Court issues a pronouncement that there are in fact sig-
nificant limits to the nexus between commerce and environ-
mental protection, there is no telling where this new Commerce
Clause jurisprudence might go once it gets rolling.0
26. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 22-24, Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629
(6th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1034).
27. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
28. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
29. The Court stated, "[wie thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant
constitutional and federalism questions raised by respondents' interpretation." SWANCC,
531 U.S. at 174.
30. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, The Hapless Toad, ATL. MONTHLY, May 2005, available
at http://www.theatlantic.comjdoc/200505/wittes ("Amid all the liberal hysteria about the
threats posed by a conservative Supreme Court, one threat tends to be ignored-and it
happens to be the biggest one ... the threat to basic environmental protections.").
Once Judge John G. Roberts had been nominated to become a member of the Supreme
Court, the more general discussion about threats posed by a changing Court took on a fo-
cused slant, even if it was still in the nature of the predictive and speculative. In this day
and age, of course, speculation about "what might happen next" is the fodder for the
gristmill of the Internet. First there was the usual legwork of those gearing up for a nomi-
nation fight: searching his record for decisions giving views on how Roberts might decide
on cases involving the Commerce Clause, and calls for probing questions in the nomina-
tion hearings. See, e.g., John W. Dean, Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter
Presses Judge John Roberts on His Commerce Clause Views, FINDLAW, Aug. 12, 2005,
available at http://writ.findlaw.com/dean/20050812.html (commenting on the need for
questions about Robert's Commerce Clause views before his confirmation hearings). Yes,
this commentary comes from that John W. Dean, and yes, it is a bit ironic that the former
White House counsel and Watergate central figure is now offering views on the power of
the federal government. But his analysis is pretty darn good.
Then, a dissection of the hearings themselves. No sooner had Senators quizzed then-
nominee Roberts about his views on the Commerce Clause than the exchange was re-
peated and analyzed voluminously in cyberspace. See, e.g., Alex Kaplun, Roberts DucksQuestions on E-Commerce Clause But Addresses ESA, ENV'T & ENERGY DAILY, Sept. 14,
2005, available at http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/print/2005/09/14/1.
There are numerous views out there on what decisions in Rapanos and Carabell could
portend in this regard. A poster on the liberal "Daily Kos" website offers a detailed andinteresting analysis, based on a "class essay" from blogger "renaissance grrl." See Mr. Ra-
panos Goes to Washington, Posing a Threat to the Clean Water Act, DAILY KOS, Nov. 30,
2005, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/11/30/12571/111 (commenting that "[n]ow the
U.S. Supreme Court, trending toward a less and less expansive reading of the Constitu-
tion, is signaling that it may be prepared to significantly limit the power of Congress to
enact environmental legislation, and the power of federal agencies to enforce it."). I'd give
the essay an "A."
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Certainly the Endangered Species Act would be in jeopardy, as
then-Judge John Roberts intimated in his confirmation hearings
when he largely ducked sharp questioning about his opinion dis-
cussing government regulation of a "hapless toad" that spent its
whole life in California.31 Our newest Justice, Samuel Alito, has a
restrictive view of the government's power under the Commerce
Clause, as evidenced perhaps most prominently by his dissent in
U.S. v. Rybar, a gun case from 1996.32 We may well find years
from now that the most significant impact that our new Justices
have had on the law has little to do with contemporary hot button
social issues such as abortion 3 and guns and more with federal
regulation that has for decades been justified under the Com-
merce Clause. But that is a subject for another day.
Beyond that, what strikes me as truly compelling about the
juxtaposition of Rapanos and Carabell on the one hand, and our
symposium on the Bay on the other, is something I will call the
paradox of the "isolated man." John Rapanos is the David Lucas
34
of his time, a put-upon man who simply wants to get on with his
shopping center without having to worry about those pesky wet-
lands, and whose means of choice for accomplishing this is becom-
ing embroiled in an almost perfect test case situated at the outer
limits of environmental laws. Rapanos seems particularly blame-
worthy, having well earned (it seems) the title of "jerk."3 ' He built
31. The word "jeopardy" is a deliberate choice. Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act requires each federal government agency that is "likely to jeopardize the contin-
ued existence" of an endangered or threatened species to consult with the relevant agency
that administers the ESA about means to protect the species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4)
(2000). Then-Judge Roberts may have criticized the broad reach of the ESA in his opinion
in Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158. 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003), but as various commenta-
tors have made clear, the procedural context of his opinion made it extremely difficult to
read the tea leaves. Roberts was dissenting from a denial of rehearing, not offering a posi-
tion on the substantive reach of the ESA. Nonetheless, the "gratuitous" nature of the dis-
sent suggests Roberts's discomfort with a broadly read Commerce Clause. See Dean, supra
note 30 (noting that Roberts intended to "make the point that the majority holding was, in
his view, 'inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in United States v. Lopez, and
United States v. Morrison'" and that "[a]lthough this dissent does not say how Judge Rob-
erts would have decided the case, it certainly suggests that he views the Commerce Clause
extremely narrowly") (citing Rancho, 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting)).
32. U.S. v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
33. See Wittes, supra note 30, at 48 (noting that the threat to environmental protec-
tion in a conservative Court is more serious than that to Roe v. Wade because "[1]iberals
have been overselling the threat to reproductive rights for decades"); Mr. Rapanos Goes to
Washington, supra note 30 (observing that "Roe v. Wade is not the only precedent threat-
ened by a rearranged Supreme Court").
34. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
35. Mr. Rapanos Goes to Washington, supra note 30.
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a subdivision, filled in wetlands, and then dared the government
to sue him; which, naturally, it did. When a consultant, Dr. Goff,
told him his property contained wetlands, he ordered Dr. Goff to
destroy the report and paid no heed to it.36 Then, after he had
gone forward over the government's objection, he had the nerve to
claim that his behavior did not warrant stiff sanctions, but in-
stead, that he should be allowed to go scot-free. 7 The courts even-
tually disagreed.3"
Rapanos and Carabell have attracted notoriety for having utter
disregard for the environmental consequences of their actions.
They argue, in effect, that if a river is going to be cleaned up it is
not their problem. In the immortal words of Fleetwood Mac, a de-
cision that favors John Rapanos is a license to anyone else to "Go
Your Own Way."39
But, as John Rapanos would protest, that is exactly what I am
entitled to do: because the connection between my behavior and
pollution of the distant river is so attenuated, the government has
no business regulating my actions. Consider this the new mindset
of the "isolated man," if you will. Instead of submitting his project
to the delay and cost it would entail to obtain a dredge and fill
permit, his starting point-the very place where he begins to
think about environmental protection-is an objection based on
the premise that government has no reason to become involved in
his affairs. This mindset could have far-ranging consequences. A
decision in Rapanos's favor might embolden others to challenge
regulatory activity, whether or not those challenges were merito-
rious. That these challenges would divert resources that might
otherwise be used for environmental protection would be of no
consequence to the isolated man, who sees himself as an individ-
ual with rights, not a citizen of a broader polity.
Of course, the likelihood of increased litigation is hardly going
to be the most significant effect of a decision in John Rapanos's
36. See United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 632 (6th Cir. 2004). Rapanos "stated
he would .'destroy' Dr. Goff if he did not comply." Id. Nice guy, this Rapanos.
37. Id. at 633-35.
38. I say "courts" (emphasis on the plural) because the Rapanos case made its way up
and down through various federal courts for well over a decade. See id. at 633-34, 649
(giving a chronology of the civil and criminal proceedings). The length of the proceedings
is attributable in part to courts struggling to determine the applicability of SWANCC (de-
cided after he was convicted and sentenced) to Rapanos's case. Id.
39. FLEETWOOD MAC, Go Your Own Way, on RUMOURS (Warner Bros. 1977).
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favor, leaving aside the possible wild card of opening up the Pan-
dora's Box of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. John Rapanos
does not see (or cares not to see, as he can hardly claim he acted
inadvertently) what others might see about the environmental
impacts of his actions. Expressing alarm that regulation of iso-
lated wetlands "expand[s] ... Congress's Commerce Clause power
... to envelop any molecule of water that might one day reach a
river,"4° as the Washington Legal Foundation so pithily (and
wrongly) puts it, constitutes blatant disregard for the intercon-
nected nature of water resources, for the notion that wetland
functions that can be performed by even those wetlands that have
only a hydrologic connection to a nearby river.
The isolated man, with his "me first" attitude about environ-
mental protection, can hamper the process of protecting an entire
watershed. Imagine, if you will, a symposium on the Bay such as
those we have held here-or, perhaps, a General Assembly meet-
ing to discuss funding for the Bay (or a Department of Environ-
mental Quality meeting to discuss water quality standards)-
with John Rapanos in the room. Let us now also assume, as we
must, that Rapanos has prevailed in the Supreme Court (other-
wise his stance would not have been vindicated and there would
be no need to heed his argument) and that a new pollution reduc-
tion program of some sort would involve him in its reach. Per-
haps, let's say, the regulatory program would have required him
to adopt "best management practices"41 to reduce pollution from
his parking lot, or to do so with incentives offered through a new
funding program.
At that point, Rapanos's presence in the meeting where new
pollution control strategies are being discussed will have that
galvanizing effect common to all who feel the concentrated pinch
of government in a room of beneficiaries whose benefits are dif-
fuse and indirect at best. He is, for better or worse, a lightning
rod. Here, we think, is that precise person whose ox is gored if we
implement the pollution reduction program. Unless we want pro-
gress to be minimal at best, someone has to look that person in
the eye and say, "Yes, sir, if this program goes forward, you would
40. Washington Legal Foundation Amicus Brief, supra note 23 at 8.
41. BMPs are authorized under Section 319 of the Clean Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. §
1329(b)(2)(A) (2000); Eisen, supra note 11, at 26-29 (discussing BMPs available for control
of pollution from stormwater runoff and discussing the considerable challenges in imple-
menting them).
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be required to make a small sacrifice for the public good." If
Judge Merhige were still with us, he would be that person,42 but
alas, he is not. I miss him for his backbone and integrity.
Unfortunately, this scenario is hardly hypothetical. In the case
of the Chesapeake Bay, the far-reaching pollution reduction pro-
gram under the Chesapeake Bay Agreement might take the form
of "a regulatory TMDL covering the entire 64,000-square-mile
Bay watershed [that] will be put in place by 2011 if Bay water
quality is not restored by 2010. '' 4' A TMDL, or "total maximum
daily load," is, as the name implies, the total amount of pollution
allowed in a body of water without violating the water quality
standards established under the CWA." Once the total load is es-
tablished, the regulatory body determines for specific point
sources and nonpoint sources the amounts that each are allowed
to contribute toward that total load.4 There must be a TMDL in
place before trading occurs; you need to know what reductions
you want to accomplish before you begin trading.46 A more collec-
tive response to water pollution in a watershed is hard to imag-
ine: one sets a total amount of pollution and then requires every-
one to reduce their individual pollution loads to get the aggregate
amount below that level. As Jon Mueller points out, a negative
decision in Rapanos would mean that the state or the EPA (as
appropriate) probably would not be able to set a TMDL for waters
over which it did not have jurisdiction, so Rapanos would be in
the clear by definition. 7
One possible response to all of this is that Rapanos might not
resist a broad pollution reduction program because what we
42. The Virginia Environmental Endowment, a major force in providing funding and
support for cleanup of the environment, exists because this visionary jurist approved a
settlement of Kepone litigation that directed $8 million of the fine to creation of the VEE.
See The Virginia Environmental Endowment, History of Virginia Environmental Endow-
ment, http://www.vee.org/history.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2006).
43. CBF Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 22-23; CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM,
CHESAPEAKE 2000 BAY AGREEMENT 6, available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs
chesapeake2000agreement.pdf.
44. Under Section 303 of the Clean Water Act, TMDLs are set for impaired waters not
meeting water quality standards despite the imposition of effluent limitations. 33 U.S.C. §
1313(d) (2000).
45. Id. § 1313(d)(1).
46. See, e.g., Water Quality Trading Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. 1608, 1610 (Jan. 13, 2003)
(specifying that "[aill water quality trading should occur within a watershed or a defined
area for which a TMDL has been approved").
47. CBFAmicus Brief, supra note 2, at 25-27.
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would ask of him is no sacrifice at all. That is, if he chose volun-
tarily to take the funding, it might actually be a benefit to him.
Or, in some other respect, we might allow him to trade in such a
manner that it would be in his economic self-interest to do so. I
am by no means an expert on the intricacies of what it would take
to create a watershed-wide TMDL or trading program, but it
seems to me that it would be extraordinarily difficult to construct
a program where everyone is better off if it is implemented. There
will be winners and losers, and one of them may well be John Ra-
panos.
One might also say that I am not comparing apples to oranges:
after all, we have not been all that successful until now in avoid-
ing the conflict between prospective winners and losers in a Bay
protection program. The poultry farmers in the region have flexed
their collective muscle to keep tough nonpoint source regulations
from taking effect. And let's not forget about the suburban home-
owners who profess to be interested in saving the Bay but con-
tribute day by day to its demise. Still, to me there appears to be a
significant difference between the homeowners (and even the
poultry farmers) on the one hand and John Rapanos on the other.
The former have evinced at least some interest in saving the Bay,
even if they are as yet unwilling to swallow the serious medicine
it would take to get the job done right. By contrast, Rapanos is
unwilling in any significant respect to engage in a public conver-
sation about the means to the end of protecting valuable re-
sources.
That is the central feature of the mindset of the isolated man:
he just says no, without regard for any arguments to the con-
trary. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation's amicus brief is bolstered
with citations to the work of dozens of scientists who show ably
that a watershed is a complex system full of interdependent proc-
esses.4" Against all the weight of this evidence stands one man,
John Rapanos. Like a heroic figure in a Western movie, he thinks
he is the last principled man standing, but the difference is that
he is wrong. He does not have the humility to understand that
there may be forces at work that are larger than he can compre-
hend. More to the point, he does not care.
48. Id. at 4-20.
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Of course, this spotlights the true danger of a decision in Ra-
panos or Carabell that reverses the lower courts' rulings. As the
CBF brief puts it, "a decision to strip Clean Water Act ("CWA")
safeguards from non-navigable tributaries and their adjacent
wetlands will cause great harm to the Chesapeake Bay, its water-
shed, its aquatic ecosystem, and its people."49 This does not cause
John Rapanos great concern. He does not lose sleep wondering
whether oysters in the Chesapeake Bay are going to perish be-
cause he stood firm. The question, then, is what is to be done
about it.
Start with the most obvious: the Court should refuse to take
the bait and decline to allow Rapanos to opt out of the environ-
mental protection system. Assume the ultimate decision is to be
based on the Commerce Clause; if it is not, it is hard to see why
the Court bothered to take on two cases that effectively would
serve as pocket parts to SWANCC. Tell John Rapanos that if he
fills in what he and his cronies at the Washington Legal Founda-
tion think is a mere "mud puddle," his activity "falls within Con-
gress' power to regulate intrastate activities that [']substantially
affect['] interstate commerce," in the words of Lopez as reflected
in SWANCC.5 ° There is more there-much more-than meets the
eye.
Then, we need to continue to work proactively on the state, lo-
cal, and regional level. Assume that even if Mr. Rapanos and Mrs.
Carabell are recognized for what they truly are (that is, if they
lose their appeals), where there is smoke, there is fire. Someday,
a more appealing litigant may well come along and, given the
Court's new dynamics, it might be the CWA's turn to fall. There
is not much time before the raison d'etre for federal jurisdiction is
undermined in part or in whole, and it will be up to the states (or
regions, in the case of the Chesapeake Bay) to stem the trend,
overcome the mindset of the isolated man, and design environ-
mental protection programs that bring in everyone. We need to
have the vision today to recognize that at that crucial juncture, it
will fall to the states and regions to design programs that bring
every polluter to the table and require them to save the Bay. This
gives Bay cleanup programs now underway a sense of true ur-
gency.
49. Id. at 2.
50. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
160-61 (2002); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
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